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The world of microfinance is changing. More and more people are 
turning to microfinance as neoliberal reforms shape the world, 
diminishing welfare across the globe. Microfinance has in turn been 
debased by the same process driving people to seek microfinance. 
Through privatization, state redistribution, and financialization, (three 
of the processes of accumulation by dispossession) microfinance, is 
becoming increasingly profitable. As the poor populations of the 
world are coming to rely on microfinance, they are opening 
themselves up to exploitation by global investors and microfinance 
institutions alike. Twice, microfinance crises have ravaged Andhra 
Pradesh, bringing with them coercive loan collection, rural distress 
and a diminished capacity for fulfilling consumption needs. These 
stem from neoliberal reforms undertaken by India in the 1980s and the 
increased accumulation by dispossession (David Harvey’s take on 
Marx’s primitive accumulation) that followed. Regulation of 
microfinance will do little to stop another crisis if the root causes of 
the crisis are not addressed. This paper presents the Andhra Pradesh 
crises as a method where by capitalist are exploiting the people of 
Andhra Pradesh for profitability at the expense of the poor through 
accumulation by dispossession.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
“It was on the cover story of a national magazine laying on his desk- a woman 
sitting lifeless in front of a framed photo of her 20 year old daughter, Mounika, 
who had immolated herself. The cover of the magazine read “Death by Default- 
Microfinance Institutions grow at 80% plus by using borrowers’ lives as 
collateral”. The girl’s family had been in a debt trap. It had started off with a loan 
from a microfinance institution to buy a sewing machine to start a small tailoring 
enterprise. Unable to keep up with the weekly commitments of loan repayments, 
one loan had become four, each one taken to pay off the earlier one. But they only 
sank deeper. The story in the November issue read “On September 25, 2010, the 
collection agents told Mounika’s mother to sell her daughter to the flesh trade and 
repay. Mounika chose to die.”” (Mohan and Siddharth, 2011: 2).  
 
This is a narrative starkly at odds with the view most have of microfinance, 
however it was at one point a common reality for millions of people placed in 
similar (although generally less extreme) positions in Andhra Pradesh, a coastal 
Indian state. Saddled with crippling debt and collection agents knocking at their 
doors, many clients felt they had no way to escape their debt burdens. Although 
microfinance had its humble beginnings as a philanthropic development tool 
designed to lift people out of poverty, that goal was quickly discarded when the 
profitability of microfinance was fully realized. Making profitability the primary 
goal of microfinance has translated into over indebtedness among impoverished 
populations. This over-indebtedness has in turn translated into debt crises 
localized within the microfinance sector. Twice, Andhra Pradesh has been the 
subject of microfinance crises. In the first instance, homes were seized, and a 
protest to reclaim the house deeds culminated in 50 microfinance institutions 
being shut down. In the second instance, emboldened microfinance institutions 
resorted to the above-mentioned, and other, coercive collection tactics, resulting 
in regulation, mass default, and the crippling of Andhra Pradesh’s microfinance 
sector. Andhra Pradesh is unique in India, having suffered through not one but 
two microfinance crises within the past decade. This thesis will strive to answer 
the question: what makes Andhra Pradesh so prone to microfinance crises?  
 
 
Aims and Significance 
 
 
By 2010 India possessed the largest microfinance industry in the world, and 
almost one-third of this industry was centered in the southern state of Andhra 
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Pradesh, which houses only 7% of India’s population (Levin, 2012: 112). Aided 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Bank (WB) and the state 
of Andhra Pradesh’s neoliberal reforms, were seen as a beacon for what 
microfinance and neoliberal reform could accomplish, with the Economist hailing 
it as ‘the state that would reform India’ (2000). Due to this attention and interest, 
microfinance took off so successfully that by 2010, almost all households in 
Andhra Pradesh had a microfinance loan (Nair, 2011: 23). It was amidst this 
copious praise and international attention that the microfinance crises took place. 
 
Microfinance in Andhra Pradesh is in a continual state of flux. The industry builds 
itself up to unsustainable levels, turns to coercive collection tactics, and then a 
crisis strikes, crippling the microfinance sector. However, almost immediately 
following the crises, demand for microfinance and other streams of credit make an 
immediate rebound. This has several causes, at the root of which lies 
neoliberalism1 and the trappings which follow it. The people of Andhra Pradesh 
are inherently reliant on microfinance and other credit to meet consumption 
needs. It is this fact that microfinance institutions prey upon to make profits off 
the backs of the poor. The aim of this paper will be to study the process by which 
accumulation by dispossession2 has spurred two microfinance crises in Andhra 
Pradesh. This is particularly urgent in light of the recent resurgence of 
microfinance in Andhra Pradesh, which if history serves as a lesson, will entail 
another microfinance crisis as well. The microfinance crises are merely a 
symptom and manifestation of the larger accumulation by dispossession crisis 
facing Andhra Pradesh currently, which will be elucidated below.  
 
 
Outline of the Study 
 
 
Chapter Two will provide a general background of development in India leading 
up to the introduction of microfinance, while paying specific attention to the 
microfinance crises. Chapter Three will introduce the theory used for this paper, a 
Marxist analytical tool developed by David Harvey and termed ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. Chapter Four will outline the methodology of the paper, including 
literature choices. Chapter Five will analyze a wide range of literature on the 
Andhra Pradesh microfinance crises to find catalysts for the crises that are unique 
                                                
1 Neoliberalism is the term used to describe the trend of economic liberalization that began in the 
1980s, continuing to present day. Neoliberalism entails privatization, deregulation, free trade, 
diminished state capacity and spending. Neoliberalism believes in small governments and market 
led economies, which government has no place in. Capitalists, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and most developed nations (the UK, the US, etc.) typically espouse neoliberal 
views. For an enthralling book outlining modern neoliberalism, see Harvey’s A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. 
2 Accumulation by dispossession is David Harvey’s take on Marx’s primitive accumulation. 
Harvey reframes primitive accumulation as an ongoing process of accumulation through predatory 
and often times fraudulent methods. It is discussed more fully in the theory chapter (page 11) but 
for the following chapter no in-depth knowledge on the notion is required. 
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to Andhra Pradesh, using Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession. Chapter Six 
will provide concluding remarks as well as an under-view of the study. 
 
  
Delimitations 
 
 
The research into the causes of the 2010 Andhra Pradesh crisis is fairly limited. In 
fact, research on the 2010 Andhra Pradesh crisis is limited in general. For the 
background portion, three narratives were identified regarding causes of the 
microfinance crisis, and authors espousing each of these three narratives were 
combined to form an overarching narrative on the socio-political processes taking 
place prior to the 2010 crisis. These are peer-reviewed articles representing a very 
limited field of research, as such they make up almost the entire body of research. 
For the analysis portion, an inter-disciplinary approach was taken in finding 
research. Most of the research utilized in the analysis portion comes from well-
respected critical authors writing on the evolution of the microfinance industry. 
Most of these scholars are critical political economist, and were chosen due to 
their renown within the field of critical microfinance research. The research 
regarding the neoliberal reforms in India comes mainly from Indian scholars and 
professors, mostly in the field of economics. This is, again, because research is 
fairly limited within the field, especially critical research. Most of the 
delimitations made are actually limitations on the research, but have served to 
narrow down the field to a manageable size. 
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2. Historical Background  
 
 
 
 
 
Capitalist Development and Rural Credit Schemes in 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
India’s development regime has remained largely unchanged since colonial times. 
Therefore, to understand the current development framework, the history of 
development within India must first be reviewed.  
 
Several scholars have posited that capitalism began in England. As India was a 
British colony for a substantial amount of time, it is no wonder that capitalism 
was introduced to India through colonialism. In this way, the beginnings of (what 
we now think of as) development and colonialism are inextricably linked. The 
idea of development was originally created as a way to institute capitalism 
without wreaking the social havoc it had wrought in early capitalist England 
(Allen & Thomas, 2000: 266). In this way, it formed the foundation for the 
ongoing paradigm of the developed North coming to the aid of the 
underdeveloped South. The main way that imperialist England believed it could 
help to improve colonial India (or any of their colonies) was through 
incorporation into the new capitalist world order, paired with development. As 
such, development has always been linked intrinsically with the liberal ideals of 
capitalism. 
 
The British began their development agenda in India through providing rural 
credit to farmers. As agriculture has always been inherently risky in India (owing 
to high population density and variable weather), Indian farmers have very 
unstable income. As an answer to this problem, the British began providing credit 
to rural farmers during times of economic hardship (Mohan, 2004). This was the 
perfect solution for imperialist England: incorporating rural populations into a 
capitalist system, while at the same time aiding in development. These original 
providers of rural credit were known as ‘nidhis’, and by 1896 there were nearly 
200 of them in rural India (Wolff, 1896: 191). However, by looking through 
‘People’s Banks: A Record of Social and Economic Success’, written by H.W. 
Wolff in 1896, it becomes clear that these banks were not entirely philanthropic. 
According to Wolff, these provide a “happy hunting-ground for the dividend-
hunter” with interests up to 37.5% on the loans provided (1896: 192). As will be 
illustrated below, this bears uncanny resemblance to modern day microfinance 
within India.  
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Moving ahead to more modern times, India has still retained its provision of rural 
credit as a leading means of development. Its central bank, the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI)3, is one of the few of its kind with specific outlines for rural credit 
provision (Mohan, 2004). From its foundation through to the present day, the RBI 
continues to try to increase participation in cooperative banking and rural credit 
schemes as one of its main objectives (Mohan, 2004). The provision of rural 
credit has long been the corner stone of the development regime in India. 
 
This brings us to the current iteration of government-run rural credit schemes in 
India: self-help groups. Self-help groups (SHGs) are loosely based on the 
Grameen Bank model of microfinance. A group of women will form a borrower 
group, pool their capital, and eventually take out a loan, which is then divided 
amongst the group. This group-lending model has many critiques, which will not 
be elaborated here (see: Karim, 2011; Maclean, 2013; Rankin, 2001; Weber, 2004 
if interested in gendered critiques of microfinance). However, it also has some 
very powerful supporters, most notably the World Bank (WB). In 2003, the WB 
began the ‘Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project’, which ran through 
2011 (World Bank Website, 2012). The entire project was founded and carried 
out to incorporate more women into SHGs. Eight years, 276 million US$, and two 
microfinance crises later, the project had reached an estimated 11.1 million 
women within Andhra Pradesh alone (World Bank Website, 2012), which equates 
to roughly one fourth of the female population. As the average Indian household 
size is 5-6 people, it’s no stretch to say that almost every household in Andhra 
Pradesh was incorporated into a SHG through this initiative.  
 
However, despite the wide prevalence of the SHG lending model, many people 
were unhappy with the service they were receiving from the SHGs. They are 
bogged down by bureaucracy, meaning that loans can take months to procure 
through SHGs (Taylor, 2011). Bearing in mind the volatile nature of Indian 
agriculture and the reasons many families need credit (sudden funeral or marriage 
costs, medical costs, loss of job, agricultural crisis) many households in Andhra 
Pradesh began turning to other sources of credit, namely microfinance, which was 
expanding even more rapidly than SHGs. 
 
 
Modern Microfinance 
 
 
Microfinance has been a household concept for quite a few years. Most of the 
public, when thinking of microfinance, view it as a remarkable idea for 
empowering women to become strong, independent entrepreneurs, lifting 
themselves and their families out of poverty one loan at a time. However, in 
                                                
3 The Reserve Bank of India was founded by a British act in 1934, while the British were still 
heavily reliant on rural credit schemes. 
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recent years, this discourse has been shifting, as have the institutions themselves. 
As will be expanded below, microfinance has slowly but surely been growing into 
a means of attaining profitability at the expense of the poor.   
 
Modern microfinance began with Mohamed Yunus, who took to handing out 
small loans to enterprising Bangladeshi women. To his surprise, the women 
readily paid him back. After this, Mohamed Yunus would go on to found the 
Grameen Bank, win a Nobel Prize, and declare that “credit [is] a human right” 
(Roy, 2010: 24). Yunus placed emphasis on self-employment and self-reliance as 
means to end poverty (Roy, 2010: 24). This, along with the group-lending model 
would become the mainstays of microfinance as a whole. Microfinance was 
hailed as a novel way to achieve women’s empowerment, pro-poor growth, and 
an end to poverty. 
 
From these beginnings, microfinance would morph into an almost unrecognizable 
form. In India particularly, these changes were shocking. Almost all microfinance 
institutions in Andhra Pradesh were for-profit, charging usurious interest rates. 
Towards the end of 2010, actual interest rates4 on microfinance loans reached an 
average of 50-84% due to various fine print, hidden fees and clauses 
(Priyadarshee & Ghalib, 2012). There has also been a trend of microfinance 
institutions partnering with consumer good producers, which allows microfinance 
agents to earn a commission and for consumer businesses to tap into new markets 
(Priyadarshee & Ghalib, 2012). In this scheme, buying a certain good or shopping 
at a certain supermarket becomes a condition of the loan. Desperate for credit, 
clients have little recourse other than to accept these disadvantageous terms 
(Priyadarshee & Ghalib, 2012). This increasing trend has lead Reuters (India) to 
posit the question ‘who should decide whether India’s poor need credit to acquire 
a livelihood generating asset or a color TV?’ (Chandra, 2010). It is not only 
Indian microfinance institutions that are deciding the answer to this question for 
their clients; large, renowned microfinance institutions such as BRAC and 
Grameen Bank, through partnerships with seed distributors, have taken to this 
scheme as well (Saifullah, 2001).  
 
The first principle of any microfinance institution is that microfinance loans are 
non-collateralized, meaning that in the event of default, microfinance institutions 
have no legal recourse to seize assets as a means of repayment. Due to this, 
microfinance institutions use the group-lending model to exert peer pressure to 
ensure repayment, with fairly large success. Therefore, the biggest challenge, and 
expense, for microfinance institutions is finding, establishing and training 
borrower groups. In an area such as Andhra Pradesh, with almost every household 
already associated with a borrower group, the perfect breeding ground for MFIs 
was created. Through lending to SHGs, MFIs could be assured that the societal 
                                                
4 Actual interest is calculated by adding up all of the fees not included in the stated interest rate. 
These include penalties, balloon payments, life insurance payments, etc. which are typically not 
calculated as interest. 
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aspects necessary for repayment were already in place5. As such, by 2010 over 
100 MFIs had flooded into Andhra Pradesh, saturating the market. Given that 
until 2010 there were absolutely no microfinance consumer protection laws in 
India6, coupled with the low levels of financial literacy in Andhra Pradesh, these 
MFIs were essentially free to do whatever they liked with no oversight. Many 
MFIs took advantage of this situation to employ dubious lending and collection 
practices, including the incredulously high interest rates mentioned earlier.  While 
these rates would be fraudulent in many Western nations, here they were run of 
the mill, and still vastly cheaper than traditional village moneylenders.  
 
Microfinance and the Ensuing Crises in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
Now it should be noted that when referring to this or the subsequent crisis, the 
crisis itself refers to the crash within the microfinance sector. In this way it is like 
any other economic crash/crisis, where consumer confidence and lending 
skyrockets only to have something (e.g. stock prices, regulation, etc.) interrupt the 
growth and plummet consumer confidence and borrowing, triggering a crisis. 
What’s discussed here is mainly the aspects that led to the crises, but the crisis 
itself starts the moment MFIs start to experience a massive decline in business 
over a short period of time. These are specifically called microfinance crises 
because even during both microfinance crises in Andhra Pradesh, the gross state 
domestic product (GSDP) growth remained constant at around 15% per year 
(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2014). 
 
The first sign that something was going wrong with microfinance in Andhra 
Pradesh came in 2006 with the Krishna crisis. Preceding the Krishna crisis, 
microfinance institutions began seizing house deeds as a means of repayment on 
defaulted loans, leading to upwards of 200 suicides (Mader, 2013). In a plea to 
regain the illegally seized deeds, large demonstrations were held outside of 
government facilities (Mader, 2013). In the wake of the protest and mounting 
evidence of microfinance institutions direct role as a catalyst for the suicides, the 
Andhra Pradesh state government shut down 50 microfinance institutions while 
they were being investigated for misconduct (Taylor, 2011). All of the clients of 
the microfinance institutions that were shut down received automatic loan 
forgiveness. Despite the obviously predatory nature MFIs were exhibiting in 
Andhra Pradesh, the governments, state and national, were still slow to act in 
regulating microfinance institutions. One probable reason for this lack of 
preemptive regulation is that rural populations still had a demand for credit. With 
low levels of state welfare the rural populations were still heavily reliant on credit.  
 
                                                
5 SHGs and group-lending microfinance both rely on peer pressure and shaming to insure 
repayment. This is largely successful as a means of repayment, but is also one of the most 
detrimental aspects of both types of organizations.  
6 There is now one piece of microfinance regulation. 
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Even though it would appear that shutting down microfinance institutions would 
slow down growth within the sector, it had quite the opposite effect, and aided in 
spurring the second microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh, the 2010 microfinance 
crisis. Even though the number of microfinance institutions were decreased, the 
demand for credit continued to increase, driving more clients to the remaining 
microfinance institutions. Through foreign equity investments and priority sector7 
investments from Indian banks, investment in microfinance institutions 
skyrocketed from US$ 6 million to a staggering US$ 646.9 million between 2006 
and 2010 (Mader, 2013). However, with so much money now flowing into a 
microfinance sector with limited clientele, microfinance institutions had to find a 
way to remain profitable and continue to encourage investments.  
 
Within the lending sector, it is typically the responsibility of banks to investigate 
and gauge whether their clients have the ability to make repayment on the loans 
provided to them. However, despite massive influxes of capital, microfinance 
institutions did little to invest in their own infrastructure or in finding new clients 
(the typical actions of an expanding business). As such, they began doubling 
down on their microfinance clients, allowing them to take out multiple loans with 
combined interests that far exceeded their ability to make repayments. Due to 
these irresponsible lending practices, repayment rates dwindled as default rates 
began to climb.  
 
In order to combat the falling repayment rates, microfinance institutions began 
turning to coercive tactics to ensure repayment. These included, but were not 
limited to: seizing and pawning valuables, pinning communities against 
defaulters, forced prostitution of defaulters children, and pressuring clients into 
suicide as a means to be repaid through life insurance policies (Kinetz, 2012; 
Mader, 2013). Obviously, with tactics such as these being used, it is no wonder 
why so many clients of microfinance institutions felt that suicide was their only 
way out. What is even more baffling than the collection tactics being used was the 
response these allegations drew from microfinance institutions: flat denial. Even 
after two independent reports drew the same conclusion, that microfinance 
institutions coercive collection practices played a large role in pressuring clients 
into suicide, microfinance institutions still held their ground that they were not to 
blame (Kinetz, 2012; Mader, 2013; Priyadarshee & Ghalib, 2012). Facing these 
allegations, and with microfinance institutions taking no responsibility for their 
actions, the state government of Andhra Pradesh enacted the ‘Andhra Pradesh 
Ordinance no. 9 of 2010: An Ordinance to Protect the Women Self Help Groups 
from Exploitation by the Micro Finance Institutions in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh [etc.]’. This ordinance effectively halted microfinance within the area for 
five days, causing the 2010 microfinance crisis8. Beyond passing the ordinance, 
                                                
7 To further facilitate investment in rural credit schemes, Indian banks are required to lend 40% of 
their lending portfolio to the ‘priority sector’, i.e. rural populations. Microfinance was a 
convenient way for Indian banks to fulfill this requirement.  
8 Microfinance was only halted for five days because of a regulation requiring the immediate 
registration of MFIs before they could continue operating. After five days (cont. on next page)  
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the government of Andhra Pradesh also actively encouraged clients to default on 
loans taken from coercive microfinance institutions (Yerramilli, 2013).  
 
As can be observed when the history of rural credit within Andhra Pradesh is 
viewed successively, the growth and crisis cycle of rural credit has been fairly 
volatile, and also shows no sign of slowing. The recurrent motif of misconduct by 
microfinance institutions coupled with the growing evidence that microfinance is 
ill equipped to combat poverty (Aitken, 2013; Schwittay, 2013) begs the question 
of why microfinance is still such a prevalent development tactic. One of the 
answers lies in the capitalist roots of development itself. Microfinance is the 
perfect capitalist tool for development: it incorporates the impoverished into the 
capitalist world order, removes the burden of welfare from the state, and provides 
opportunities for international investment with a “philanthropic” edge. With all of 
these boxes checked, it’s no surprise that microfinance is still such a prevalent 
development mechanism. Given that credit was already so relied upon in rural 
Andhra Pradesh, it’s even less surprising that microfinance took hold with such 
vigor in the area. However, as mentioned above, the microfinance which was 
found in Andhra Pradesh was vastly different from the microfinance which was 
originally envisioned: these microfinance institutions share more in common with 
the ‘dividend hunting’ of the ancient nidhis than modern non-profit microfinance 
institutions.   
 
 
A Comparable Indian State: Karnataka 
 
 
Karnataka, an Indian state neighboring Andhra Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh 
share many common traits. The majority of both their populations live in rural 
areas (66% in Andhra Pradesh, 63% in Karnataka) (Census Data, 2011). They 
share a similar climactic zone, both states being very flood and drought prone, 
making agriculture equally volatile in both states.  They have similar MFI 
penetration levels, while on a regional level within the states certain regions in 
Karnataka have much higher penetration levels than any region in Andhra Pradesh 
(Yerramilli, 2013). The growth rates of MFIs in both states between 2007-2010 
were roughly the same, at 129% in Karnataka and 126% in Andhra Pradesh 
(Yerramilli, 2013). Despite all of these similarities, Andhra Pradesh has twice 
been ravaged by crises of microfinance, while Karnataka has been unaffected. It is 
interesting to note that another difference between the two states is the high level 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB involvement in Andhra Pradesh, 
while Karnataka remained largely untouched by the IMF and WB and their 
aggressively neoliberal policies (Yerramilli, 2013). 
                                                                                                                                 
and numerous court petitions, the deadline was extended, giving MFIs a further three weeks before 
they had to be registered. Despite this, MFIs still blamed the ordinance for their abysmal financial 
performance. 
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3. Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
 
 
The theory used for this thesis will be grounded in Marxism. However, as 
Marxism is a huge theory with an even bigger scholarly base, the focus will be on 
David Harvey’s interpretation of Marx’s primitive accumulation: accumulation by 
dispossession. 
 
Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation operates in two phases. The first of these 
phases is the accumulation and centralization of capital. This is the growth phase 
of early capitalism. As capitalism expands, larger, more powerful capitalists, 
centralizing capital among the elites, swallow up smaller, weaker capitalists. 
Accumulation takes place by expansion of the capitalist system, either spatially or 
temporally. Colonialism is a pertinent example of violent accumulation through 
expansion within early capitalism. The second phase could aptly be termed 
‘dispossession’. In this phase, labourers are ‘dispossessed’, often times violently, 
of their means of production and subsistence (Batou, 2015). This is done as a 
means of creating a labour force capable of selling their labour to capitalists. In 
this way, primitive accumulation can aptly be understood as a process of both 
accumulation and dispossession. For Marx, primitive accumulation was a deeply 
exploitative notion. It took place outside of the productive sphere, resting on “the 
exchange of unequal values, thus of swindling or usury, and definitely on various 
forms of parasitism at the expense of the productive economy” (Batou, 2015: 15). 
The weakness in Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation is the temporal limit 
placed on the notion. Primitive accumulation takes place exclusively during the 
formation of capitalism, or ‘pre-capitalism’. After capitalism is established, 
capitalist accumulation takes it’s place, which is still predatory but much less 
violent and fraudulent. 
 
It was here that David Harvey broke with traditional Marxism and coined the term 
‘accumulation by dispossession’, reframing primitive accumulation as an ongoing 
process. The weakness of viewing primitive accumulation as only occurring 
during a set time period in the evolution of capitalism “is that [it relegates] 
accumulation based upon predation, fraud, and violence to an ‘original stage’ that 
is considered no longer relevant” (Harvey, 2003: 144). According to David 
Harvey (2005), accumulation by dispossession is defined by four main features: 
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1. Privatization and commodification. Privatization entails the transferring of 
previously public goods to the hands of private interests, who then 
commodify that good and sell it for capital accumulation. This includes 
water and land rights, welfare, and public institutions, along with many 
other services and utilities the state previously provided. This feature 
necessarily entails a rolling back of the state, as the function of the state in 
social matters is diminished.  
2. State redistributions. While the role of the neoliberal state is diminished in 
regards to the social sector, it still holds a monopoly on redistributive 
policies. In order to foster capital accumulation, the state privatizes many 
services, cutting back on their own state expenditure, but opening up a 
flourishing market based on the exploitation of necessary goods and 
services (housing, education, health care, etc.). This redistributes wealth, 
allowing the rich to have exclusive access to certain goods. The state also 
engages in corporate welfare, such as tax breaks or subsidies for large 
corporations or wealthy individuals, placing a disproportionately high tax 
burden on low-wage labourers. This again modifies the role of the state. 
“In developing countries, where opposition to accumulation by 
dispossession can be stronger, the role of the neoliberal state quickly 
assumes that of active repression even to the point of low-level warfare 
against oppositional movements” (165).  
3. Financialization. Due to the diminished role of the state, more and more 
aspects of life are becoming financialized, in the sense that they now 
provide a new means of exploitation through capital accumulation. This 
deregulation and subsequent financialization “has allowed the financial 
system to become one of the main centers of redistributive activity through 
speculation, predation, fraud, and thievery” (161). In this sense, many 
aspects of life are now subject to the turbulence of the markets. 
4. The management and manipulation of crises. Harvey posits that one of the 
primary means of accumulation by dispossession is found in the ‘debt 
trap’ and ensuing debt crises that arise once the debt burden has 
overwhelmed the afflicted population. In this way, “crisis creation, 
management, and manipulation on the world stage has evolved into the 
fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the 
rich” (162). These crisis situations further aid accumulation through the 
creation of unemployment, resulting in a labour surplus, which can then be 
further exploited. However, debt crises can be volatile, and if they spiral 
out of control they could potentially have detrimental effects to the 
capitalist system. In this paradigm, “one of the prime functions of state 
interventions and of international institutions is to control crises and 
devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur 
without sparking a general collapse or popular revolt” (162). 
 
 
David Harvey introduced accumulation by dispossession in his 2003 book The 
New Imperialism. In 2005 it was again reiterated in A Brief History of 
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Neoliberalism; but in both of these books, and several papers also including the 
term, Harvey has failed to fully define the term beyond the specific processes 
mentioned above. This had left the field open for several scholars to posit their 
own definition, or to use the term in analyzing various phenomena that wouldn’t 
be possible if the definition had been fully laid out by Harvey.  
 
Due to the recent neoliberalization in India, there are many studies taking place 
critiquing the neoliberal reforms, and much of it uses accumulation by 
dispossession, which has become somewhat of a mainstay in critical neoliberal 
studies. Swapna Banerjee-Guha, in a book and an article, has written about to rise 
of popular discontent in the face of increased accumulation by dispossession, how 
India’s development is being measured more and more by how the public feel 
excluded in the new neoliberal India (2010; 2013). Michael Levien has used 
accumulation by dispossession to study the Indian governments use of imminent 
domain to grab farmers land transfer the ownership to corporations to form 
special economic zones (2011). Within the field of microfinance research, 
accumulation by dispossession has also been well received. Keating et. al. (2010) 
use Nancy Hartsock’s (2006) gendered take on accumulation by dispossession to 
critique the ‘empowerment’ rhetoric that used to take center stage in microfinance 
discourse. Recently, a string of research on the financialization of microfinance 
has taken place, much of which is grounded within accumulation by dispossession 
(Aitken, 2013; Mader, 2014; Schwittay, 2013). 
 
This thesis will draw from many of the above-mentioned sources, but the main 
theoretical framework used will be that laid out above. Additionally, inspiration 
will be drawn from Levien’s definition of accumulation by dispossession as “the 
use of extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of subsistence, production or 
common social wealth for capital accumulation” (2011: 457), due to the pertinent 
nature of the definition in application to the microfinance crises.  
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4. Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
Analytical Narratives 
 
 
The methodology used for this thesis largely flows from the theory used, and the 
framework set up by accumulation by dispossession, but it also takes the form of 
an analytical narrative guided by accumulation by dispossession rather than game 
or rational choice theory. Analytical narratives are “motivated by a desire to 
account for particular events and outcomes” (Bates et al., 1998: 3), and that is 
what this thesis seeks to do. Analytical narratives stress the importance of logic 
and (in a non-theoretical sense) rational choice in finding the most likely causes of 
a studied phenomenon. The term is composed of two parts: narrative and analysis. 
A narrative is a story, in this case a factual story, conveying a series of events 
from a particular theoretical standpoint, so that the causes and effects of that 
narrative are easily conveyed. The narrative becomes analytical because it is 
grounded in theory and data. Although analytical narratives were originally 
intended for use with game or rational choice theory, they are being applied to 
other theoretical frameworks as well, as a useful tool that blends the historical 
narrative tradition with analytical social science research (Bates et. al., 1998). 
This thesis strives to explain a complex series of events, many of which occurred 
in tandem. To build up the narrative, some topics are touched upon multiple 
times, building upon the previous instance it was mentioned, forming layers 
which produce a clearer view of the phenomenon described. 
 
Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession is the main framework used to analyze 
the microfinance crises in Andhra Pradesh; its framework of four distinct 
processes that accumulation by dispossession follows dictated which sources and 
what type of information to use. Combined with the form of an analytical 
narrative, the historical progression of development in Andhra Pradesh will set the 
background for the later analysis of the crises in Andhra Pradesh through 
accumulation by dispossession. 
 
 
Materials  
 
 
This paper makes use of ‘theoretical sampling’ to conduct a qualitative study 
(Mason, 2002). This means that the theory guided the formation of a research 
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question, which then guided the selection of materials used. The theoretical 
framework established a guide for what type of information was needed, which 
influenced the sampling and the collection of data and material in order to fit 
within the theoretical framework. This served to limit the field of possible 
research that needed to be surveyed, as well as serving to focus the scope of the 
paper. This is also a form of what Bryman calls ‘purposive sampling’ in which 
data is collected to serve a specific purpose (2008). 
 
Overall, the research regarding the causes of the 2010 Andhra Pradesh 
microfinance causes is fairly limited to begin with. A lot of microfinance research 
briefly touches on the subject, but rarely goes in-depth when discussing the 
causes. As such, there are several papers that analyze the causes that are heavily 
drawn on to form the background portion of this thesis, Priyadarshee & Ghalib, 
Mader, Taylor, and Yerramilli. These peer-reviewed papers represent the three 
main narratives presented to explain the causes of the 2010 microfinance crisis, 
and in this thesis they are combined to form an overarching narrative which 
explains the background of development and microfinance in Andhra Pradesh, 
and the events leading up to the microfinance crisis.  
 
For the analysis portion, a wide interdisciplinary net is thrown to capture the 
changes currently taking place within the microfinance industry. This represents 
some of the most widely cited critical microfinance research, as well as economic 
and political economy research on microfinance, available. Authors like 
Schwittay, Roy, Aitken and Young are well-respected authors currently critically 
researching microfinance, and they add dimension to the analysis portion as well 
as credibility. The phenomena affecting microfinance are fairly well researched, 
but are often not applied specifically to Andhra Pradesh (with the exception of the 
Aitken article, which does so briefly). Indian scholars are fairly well represented 
in this paper, especially in regards to the neoliberalization process taking place in 
India. These are from professors who have dedicated much of their careers to 
researching the neoliberal reforms affecting India, and many of them have lived 
through these reforms themselves. This allows them to see nuances within the 
neoliberalization process that may be over looked within broader studies. These 
scholars are often from the economic discipline, but include political science as a 
means to understand the state processes taking place. 
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5. Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
As many papers have pointed out, microfinance cannot solely be to blame for the 
crises in Andhra Pradesh. After all, neighboring states had similarly high levels of 
microfinance saturation without suffering from the same crises.  So what forces 
coalesced to cause the crises specifically in Andhra Pradesh? While several papers 
have hinted at reasons which are partly to blame, they are few and far between 
and do not convey the whole story. 
 
 
Credit Addiction 
 
 
Beginning with the history of development and century long emphasis on rural 
credit schemes, it is clear that credit has played an important part in the formation 
of the modern agrarian society in India. Beyond this, it could be argued that while 
India has long shown a reliance on credit schemes, Andhra Pradesh is facing a 
sort of ‘credit addiction’ as evidenced through the sort of ‘withdrawal symptoms’ 
they experience following microfinance crises. After a century of being reliant on 
credit for subsistence, it is no surprise that credit has come to play a large role in 
how rural households manage their homes/livelihoods. This can be demonstrated 
through the substantially higher rate of indebtedness in Andhra Pradesh preceding 
the crisis. By 2003, 82% of all rural households in Andhra Pradesh were indebted 
compared to a national average of 48% (Taylor, 2011). This is an even more 
striking statistic when considering that in 1981, only 26% of rural households in 
Andhra Pradesh were in debt (Taylor, 2011). This credit addiction, which has 
clearly increased in the wake of neoliberal reforms, can also bee seen in the 
popular reaction to the microfinance ordinance Andhra Pradesh enacted, which 
decreed that borrowers were only able to have one outstanding microfinance loan 
at a time, during what can be viewed as the withdrawal period. Following the 
crisis, the Center for Microfinance and MicroSave9 conducted baseline studies on 
the spending habits of former microfinance clients in Andhra Pradesh, asking 
them to compare their ability to meet consumption and other spending 
requirements before and after the 2010 crisis. 85% of those surveyed said that 
they now had problems in financing household consumption, health and education 
spending (Gupta, 2013). A third of all respondents said that they had cut spending 
across the board, as they could no longer access credit through sources other than 
                                                
9 This source isn’t ideal, but it is also one of the few studies done of this sort, and is by far the 
most comprehensive. 
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‘loan sharks’ (Gupta, 2013). Conversely, loan sharks, charging 60-120% interest 
have experienced a large up tick in business (Gupta, 2013). All of these findings 
were found roughly eight months after the microfinance crisis in 2010. This 
indicates that a population that was declaring microfinance as ‘death by default’ 
was starved for credit a mere eight months after microfinance was regulated and 
declined in the area. It also goes to remember the long history of credit-based 
subsistence that rural populations in Andhra Pradesh were accustomed to. As has 
been noted by Schwittay, “poor people had not just low but also fluctuating and 
unpredictable income, which forced them to develop sophisticated money 
management skills centering on borrowing and saving” (2013, 512). In other 
words, poor people know how to manage their debt. This implies that something 
else must have been going on for debt to spiral so far out of control, and one of 
the biggest, if not the biggest, changes in the recent history of Andhra Pradesh is 
neoliberalization and an ongoing cycle of accumulation by dispossession. 
 
 
Privatization and Commodification 
 
 
Between 1995 and 2004, Chandrababu Naidu served as ‘Chief Minister of the 
State’ in Andhra Pradesh, as well as being the head of the Telugu Desam Party 
(TDP), the congressional party holding power at the time in Andhra Pradesh. At 
the time Naidu took office, the IMF had recently extended a structural adjustment 
loan to Andhra Pradesh (Young, 2010), which carried with it highly liberal 
reforms as a condition of the loan, as was common practice at the time. “Naidu 
sought to further expand these reforms at the state level by introducing more fees 
for public services and further reducing subsidies for water, electricity, fertiliser, 
and credit” (Young, 2010: 615). The logic behind Naidu’s reasoning for these 
policies was that privatization of several services would spur job creation as well 
as cut state spending; however, these policies did little of either (Mader, 2013). 
While having a generally negative effect in Andhra Pradesh, these reforms 
increased investor confidence internationally, with Andhra Pradesh receiving 
international media attention. Due to this international response, the WB offered 
several loans on the condition that Andhra Pradesh made further cuts to the state 
budget (Young, 2010). This is precisely the type of privatization Harvey was 
referencing in regard to accumulation by dispossession. Privatization of these 
services did little for the public, but served to commodify essential services for 
the profit of the elites. Furthermore, the state was also profiting from these 
reforms. International attention meant more investments from the WB, IMF, and 
other international investors, padding their budget but also increasing investor 
confidence in the state.  
 
As international investment and interest heightened, the agricultural sector was 
floundering. Prior to the neoliberalization of India, the agricultural community 
held large sway in politics. Given that over 60% of Indians living in Andhra 
Pradesh make their living through agriculture, this is no surprise. In the 1980’s, in 
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an effort to create a more modern India, technology and information sectors were 
stressed as the key area of growth, and “as an occupation, cultivation came to be 
looked down upon” (Rao & Suri, 2006: 1549). As such, the government has been 
slowly removing subsidies and safeguards for agriculture, without providing a 
viable alternative means of employment to the rural populations who increasingly 
feel they have no place in the new, technology-driven India. Nowhere were these 
reforms or belief in a new, neoliberal India at all costs more vehemently adhered 
to than in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
In keeping with neoliberal ideology, government spending in the agricultural 
sector has steeply declined. During the 1980-1981 fiscal period, the Andhra 
Pradesh government spent 11.8% of state expenditure on sustainable agricultural 
infrastructure; by 2001-2002, agricultural spending was down to 1.8%, where as 
the Indian national average was 5% (Rao & Suri, 2006). This is a large catalyst 
for the severe water management issues currently facing rural Andhra Pradesh. 
Along with diminished government spending on agriculture, lack of government 
subsidies for agricultural input has made agriculture in Andhra Pradesh the most 
expensive of any state in India (Rao & Suri, 2006). This is the basis for the 
ongoing agrarian crisis currently taking place in Andhra Pradesh. Through 
neoliberal reforms, and the privatization of all types of government support for the 
agricultural community, many of the rural peoples of Andhra Pradesh are being 
left behind and ignored by their government. It was under these conditions of 
agricultural distress, owing to the wave of privatization, that Andhra Pradesh 
largely privatized their development policies by turning to microfinance and as a 
market-driven alternative for development.  
 
State Redistributions 
 
 
While stories of India’s massive growth in GDP, along with stories of India’s 
immense poverty are widely reported on, the public rarely connects the two. In 
India, massive GDP growth and steep increases in inequality have served as two 
sides of the same coin.  
 
India is increasingly prioritizing GDP growth over the welfare of her own people. 
In a country with 97 billionaires, a number which is only topped by China and the 
US, it is almost shameful that three fourths of Indians subsist on a daily income 
less than US$ 2 (Bhaduri, 2008). However, it is the rich that have money to spend. 
As such, their luxury needs are being increasingly prioritized over the needs of the 
many. As such, GDP growth is feeding inequality as more and more of India’s 
industries are catering to the luxury ‘wants’ of the few and ignoring the needs of 
the poor. 
 
In order to realize a neoliberal India driven by a booming technology and 
outsourcing market, the rural populations have been left behind, or worse, preyed 
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upon. The predatory nature of state redistributions is rampant in many parts of 
India. More of India’s public land is being seized through imminent domain, and 
then being sold or, more often, given to private corporations for mining, 
industrialization and special economic zones (SEZs) (Bhaduri, 2008; Levien, 
2011) in a movement not dissimilar to the early acts of enclosure during the 
conception of capitalism. The SEZs are also non-taxed, so as to attract business, 
but it only serves to place an unfair tax burden on the poor while the largest 
income generators contribute nothing to society but menial job opportunities (for 
research on work conditions in SEZs in Andhra Pradesh see Cross, 2009). These 
private interests are not only inheriting the land rights, but also the rights to the 
ground water below these lands, siphoning water from an agrarian community 
already in a state of distress.  All across India, water rights to industry are being 
increased. In Gujarat, water rights to industry increased five-fold, while 
decreasing water allocation to the distressed rural community (Walker, 2009). In 
2009, the time of that statistic, the state of Gujarat had 8 functional SEZs and 48 
formal approvals; Andhra Pradesh, by comparison, had 19 functional SEZs and 
103 formal approvals (Ministry of Commerce, 2010). This is indicative of a wider 
trend of Andhra Pradesh pushing state redistributions more aggressively than 
other states, a trend which continues to present day. In 2013 (the last year the 
Ministry of Commerce published an annual report) Andhra Pradesh had 38 
functional SEZs, the most of any state, compared to Tamil Nadu’s 33 and 
Karnataka’s 21 (second and third highest amounts of SEZs) (Ministry of 
Commerce, 2013).  
 
In a further wave of neoliberalism, India not only deregulated the banking system, 
they also removed agriculture and small-scale industries from the priority lending 
sector, meaning that both of those sectors no longer have access to subsidized 
loans (Patnaik, 2004). In the state of Andhra Pradesh, this served as a final 
withdrawal of the last of the agricultural welfare programs, and a transition to 
almost total reliance on microfinance or informal means to meet credit demand.  
 
Despite the obviously growing inequalities within India, the state is still unwilling 
to jeopardize their growing GDP to aid their impoverished people. In order to 
keep accumulating capital, concern for the market is placed above all others. For 
years the Indian government has been shaping their policies to encourage 
investment, particularly through the use of SEZs. There is growing popularity 
behind the idea that “the government should raise resources through privatization 
and so-called public-private partnership, but not through raising fiscal deficit or 
imposing a significant turn over tax on transactions of securities […] these 
measures rattle the “sentiment” of the financial markets so governments remain 
wary of them” (Bhaduri, 2008: 12). It is this thinking that can be held accountable 
for the stagnation of economic reform in recent years. This trend shows a clear 
bias of state distribution in favor of the rich and wealthy, and of prioritizing a 
booming economy above all else, and the public are growing wary of this new 
emphasis placed on capital accumulation for the wealthy. Just as Harvey theorized 
that “the role of the neoliberal state quickly assumes that of […] low-level warfare 
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against oppositional movements” (2005: 165), the Indian government has had to 
contend with surmounting discontent with the proliferation of SEZs and other 
forms of corporate welfare. SEZ opposition was so widespread that 
incentivization for new SEZs was all but abandoned in 2012,10 only to face recent 
resurrection under Prime Minister Modi (Potter, 2014).  
 
Financialization 
 
 
The process of financialization serves to bring the world order in line with a 
neoliberal, capitalist notion of a world order. With such rampant neoliberalism, 
almost everything is now open to be financialized and placed on the global 
market. 
 
Poverty is increasingly being viewed in financialized terms. It is now 
commonplace to think of impoverished people as those living on less than one US 
dollar a day and it’s no surprise that this concept is now so prevalent. The World 
Bank and other capitalist institutions that are driving the development agenda 
have financialized poverty so that it can be solved using capitalist means. By 
framing poverty simply as a lack of capital, an influx of capital can be a quick fix 
(Schwittay, 2013). If poverty was reframed as a socio-political problem, then it 
would be much more difficult to justify using neoliberal means to try to solve the 
problem. However, when poverty becomes financialized, important factors are 
left out. “[Real] incomes can be rather poor indicators of important components of 
well-being and quality of life that people have reason to value” (Sen, 1999, quoted 
in Schwittay, 2013). But other factors, such as quality of life, are hard to quantify, 
making them difficult to be understood, and thereafter solved, on neoliberal terms.  
 
When poverty is financialized, so too must the mechanisms designed to address 
poverty, as such development is also being increasingly financialized. This can be 
seen in the trend of stressing ‘financial inclusion’ as a development ideology. The 
logic follows that the poor are not held back only by their lack of access to capital, 
but also by their lack of access to other financial services such as savings and 
insurance (Aitken, 2013); only through full incorporation into the global market 
and formal financial sector can poverty be ‘cured’. The World Bank and the 
United Nationals alike have long espoused financial inclusion as a means to 
escape poverty, and that access to the formal financial sector is empowering in 
itself (Taylor, 2012). The United Nations holds the belief that access to the 
financial inclusion will “economically and socially empower individuals, in 
particular poor people, allowing them to better integrate into the economy of their 
countries, actively contribute to their development and protect themselves against 
economic shocks” (United Nations, 2006, quoted in Taylor, 2012). This thinking 
has been a large catalyst for the rise of financialized microfinance, allowing the 
                                                
10 This only applied to new SEZs. Keep in mind that by 2010, Andhra Pradesh had 103 formal 
approvals for SEZs, and only 19 functioning SEZs.  
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very fact of having access to a loan to become the new means of empowerment 
attributed to the notion. 
 
This narrative of financial inclusion can most keenly be observed in what Rob 
Aitken (2013) has dubbed ‘micro/financialization’. Microfinancialization entails 
the processes by which the poor are being placed at the mercy of the international 
markets through debt accumulated by microfinance. The financialization of 
microfinance can be demonstrated in several ways. The first being the emergence 
of credit scores for the poor. Increasingly, microfinance clients are being tracked 
to see if they’re liable to default or diligently make their payments (Schwittay, 
2013). This has lead to a ‘black list’ of sorts so microfinance institutions can 
avoid risky clients, increasingly placing profit-maximization above the alleged 
poverty alleviating goals of microfinance (Aitken, 2013). Another way that 
microfinance has financialized is a trend of microfinance institutions making 
initial public offerings (IPO)11. One of the largest microfinance institutions in 
Andhra Pradesh, SKS Microfinance, made an IPO two months before the 2010 
microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh (Aitken, 2013). One of the main reasons 
why SKS Microfinance had such a successful public offering was because of their 
almost-too-good-to-be-true repayment rates. Their IPO and high repayments rates 
are cast in a new light when considering the involvement of SKS Microfinance in 
coercing several over-indebted farmers in Andhra Pradesh into suicide.  
 
Aitken points to another form of microfinancialization, the practice of 
intermediation, in which international investments in microfinance institutions are 
increasingly going through third party intermediaries (2013). These organizations 
are growing in number and popularity as the West is realizing the high profits to 
be had in microfinance. The third method of microfinancialization is securitizing12 
microfinance loans (Aitken, 2013). In this way, investors in microfinance can 
invest with little risk in the case of default or bankruptcy. The securitization of 
microfinance vastly increased the amount of investors willing to invest in 
potentially risky microfinance organizations. However, “securitization [resulted] 
in a dramatic shift in the ways in which micro-loans are held — extended and 
managed not by an institution with some presence in the communities in which 
they operate, but by distant foreign investors” (Aitken, 2013: 488). Microfinance 
clients are becoming increasingly answerable to foreign investors, and the whims 
of the international market.  
 
In traditional economics, the belief is that as supply increases, the market will 
create competition to find the lowest price possible. Despite the general 
availability of microloans increasing, interest rates have remained at incredulously 
high levels. This can be explained by the nature of microfinancialization, and the 
                                                
11 Making an IPO is the act of offering stock in a company to the market, which is then sold off to 
the public. 
12 Securitization is the act of pooling debt and selling it off to a third party, who is then able to 
collect the interest of the loan. It is similar to a defunct loan being sold off to a collection agency, 
dispersing the risk associated with lending to potentially risky clients. 
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increased pressure to retain investment. “Investors keen to extend capital are 
almost always focused on MFIs with high rates of interest and profitability […in] 
order to offer attractive terms to investors, MFIs have had to pass on high interest 
charges to their customers” (Aitken, 2013: 488). In this way, the financialization 
of microfinance has had directly detrimental impacts on the poor. As evidenced in 
Andhra Pradesh, the only ones who are benefiting from this new arrangement are 
the microfinance institutions raking in enormous profits. This sort of 
financialization allows capitalists to exert a new level of control over the poor. A 
poor population that is reliant upon markets rather than informal welfare is more 
open to predation and manipulation from capitalists and neoliberals alike. The 
coercive tactics used by microfinance institutions is another dimension of this new 
power dynamic. If a poor population is reliant on microfinance, they have no 
option but to agree to abuse and coercion at the hands of their creditors.  
 
The Management and Manipulation of Crises 
 
 
The above sections have illustrated how the rural populations of Andhra Pradesh 
became so wholly reliant on microfinance, and why they became so over-
indebted. However, the crises themselves were also a means of accumulation by 
dispossession.  
 
The securitization of microfinance has changed the ways that investors consider 
lending to microfinance organizations. When a loan is securitized, any monetary 
loss suffered through default on the loan no longer affects the investors. In this 
scenario, careful lending practices can be cast aside, opening the door for risky 
lending practices, as in the event of a debt crisis, they won’t suffer any financial 
losses.  “One recalls the statement attributed to Andrew Mellon: ‘in a depression 
assets return to their rightful owners” (Harvey, 2005: 163), and a microfinance 
crisis is a depression on a micro-scale. In a way, microfinance institutions had 
become co-opted by their investors. Investors in microfinance didn’t have to 
worry about default after their investments had been securitized, so they were free 
too keep pumping money into the sector with no thought to consequences; 
microfinance institutions were so busy trying to disperse more loans, they didn’t 
take the time to realize that they were dangerously over burdening their clients 
with debt that even peer pressure couldn’t make them pay back.  
 
It is precisely this thinking that leads to over-investment, which in turn translates 
into over-lending. With the IPO of SKS Microfinance, investment in microfinance 
in Andhra Pradesh was at an all time high (other microfinance institutions in the 
area also had future IPOs planned). However, this means increasing investment 
with limited clientele available. In order to stay profitable and keep investments 
flooding in, microfinance institutions aggressively pushed multiple loans to 
clients that didn’t have the ability to repay. Even if investors aren’t affected in the 
case of default, microfinance institutions themselves are. As such, microfinance 
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organizations turned to coercive tactics (and to a smaller extent, creative 
bookkeeping) to try to recover losses and keep investments flowing in. In such a 
highly charged environment, especially with a population indebted enough to 
believe suicide was their only way out, a crisis was triggered. As Harvey says, 
“one of the prime functions of state interventions […] is to control crises and 
devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur without 
sparking a general collapse or popular revolt” (2005: 163). As such, the 
government enacted a microfinance ordinance to repress the growing unrest that 
preceded the crisis in 2010, and wiped out 90% of the outstanding loan portfolio 
of microfinance organizations overnight (Aitken, 2013). All of the capital 
accumulation possible had already taken place, so it was better to eat the losses of 
a crisis and begin the cycle of accumulation anew. The lack of microfinance 
default spreading like a contagion can also be explained through the management 
of crises. Simply put, the government was able to placate microfinance customers 
before default had a chance to spread to other states.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Beginning in colonial times, it is clear that India has had a long history of using 
credit to meet consumption needs. It is also clear, due to the nature of early credit 
schemes in India, that they’ve long been a source of predation through 
accumulation by dispossession. This long history has made rural Indian 
populations heavily reliant on credit, and it is this reliance that capitalists have 
managed to exploit for personal gain. Nowhere in India was this credit addiction, 
or the level exploitation, more extreme than in Andhra Pradesh. Until recently, it 
was clear that although rural populations were heavily reliant on credit and 
heavily indebted, they were still employing their own tactics to manage their debt 
burdens to avoid a crisis situation or accumulate a debt too large for them to 
repay. With the coming of neoliberal reforms, and an intensification of 
accumulation by dispossession, the rural populations of Andhra Pradesh were 
pushed too far. As capitalists began to see how much profit could be made, and 
how easily the people of Andhra Pradesh could be exploited, the intensification of 
microfinance in the area overwhelmed the entire population. In a round about 
manner, the WB helped to speed this flood of microfinance, through their heavy 
investment in SHGs in Andhra Pradesh, and through their disbursal of neoliberal 
ideology.   
 
There were warning signs preceding the 2010 microfinance crisis, such as the 
2006 Krishna crisis, that the populations of Andhra Pradesh were becoming 
burdened with far more debt than they could ever hope to pay off or manage. 
However, due to the various processes of accumulation by dispossession, and how 
they affected the microfinance institutions, there was more to be gained through 
allowing a crisis than disinvesting in Andhra Pradesh. In this way, the 
microfinance crises in Andhra Pradesh can be seen as a symptom of a larger rural 
crisis brought on by neoliberal reforms and the accumulation by dispossession 
that followed them. By replacing state-run welfare services with microfinance, it 
was asking an already indebted, distressed community to now pay for more 
services when they were already struggling to meet basic consumption needs. 
Given the nature of microfinance, along with the political climate, in Andhra 
Pradesh, the crises should come as no surprise. Compounded with the lack of 
microfinance crises in Karnataka, the neighboring state with a similar 
microfinance sector, this indicates that the increased accumulation by 
dispossession localized within Andhra Pradesh could be to blame for the 
microfinance crises.  
 
Privatization, during the neoliberal reforms in the 1980s served to place more 
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financial burden on the peoples of Andhra Pradesh. Microfinance was offered as a 
way for the people to pay for services that had been cut or privatized, adding more 
debt onto already indebted people. State redistributions served to distribute 
valuable resources, such as land and water, away from rural impoverished 
populations, further upsetting an agrarian community that was already in distress. 
This distress in turn forced more and more to turn to microfinance to stay afloat. 
Commercialization can account for the impossibly high interest rates placed on 
microloans, and also for investors over enthusiasm in investing. This push for 
profitability to keep up with investments led microfinance institutions to abandon 
responsible lending practices and encourage multiple borrowing, and eventually 
coercive collection methods. Faced with all of this, and mounting debt-related (or 
instigated) suicides, the people revolted against microfinance institutions, leading 
the state to manage their population and regulate microfinance, in turn sparking 
the 2010 crisis. All of these processes, in essence, stem from the neoliberal 
reforms undertaken in the 1980s. Through neoliberalization, India was able to 
commit fully to capitalism, abandoning welfare and placing profit above other 
pursuits. This capitalist mindset created an environment that welcomed all of the 
processes of accumulation by dispossession which would eventually culminate in 
the microfinance crises. Without some sort of reform (this time away from 
neoliberal policies), the pattern of microfinance growth and crisis shows no sign 
of slowing. The microfinance crises stem from a type of accumulation by 
dispossession crisis, in which the rural populations of Andhra Pradesh are being 
exploited past the point of sustainability; the crises are just secondary symptoms.  
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